




Funeral insurance has existed at least since antiquity, and it remains pop-
ular in many parts of Africa today. Yet the study of funeral insurance as a
distinct form of insurance has hitherto been neglected. This paper presents
a model in which funeral insurance combines regular life insurance with a
restriction on how the payout is spent. The model predicts that there is an
intermediate range of income and wealth where funeral insurance is demanded.
The prediction is tested on a nationally representative sample of black South
African households, a setting where both life and funeral insurance are widely
available. The model also gives conditions under which funeral insurance is not
demanded at any level of income and wealth. This may explain why funeral
insurance is less popular in developed countries, even among the relatively
poor. JEL codes: D81, G22, O12
1 Introduction
Funeral insurance is one of the earliest documented forms of insurance. It seems to
have existed through most of history and across the globe, and it is probably still the
single most popular type of insurance in large parts of Africa. Yet the study of this
phenomenon has until recently been largely neglected by economists. The purpose
of this paper is to provide the ﬁrst treatment of funeral insurance as a distinct form
of insurance.
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CSAE Working Paper  WPS/2011-16Funeral insurance is not life insurance. What these two types of insurance have
in common is that the covered event is the death of a speciﬁed individual. But it is a
remarkably consistent feature of ‘death-triggered insurance’, both historically and in
modern-day developing countries, that the payout takes the form of funeral-related
goods and services. This is funeral insurance. In contrast, a life insurance policy
typically pays out in cash or liquid assets, and there is no restriction on how the
payout is spent. This paper claims that the distinction is fundamental, and that the
type of insurance preferred will depend on the circumstances and characteristics of
the decision-maker.
Today, formal funeral policies are oﬀered by insurance companies in many parts
of the world. But the history of funeral insurance, and insurance generally, is closely
linked to that of funeral associations. From ancient Greece and Rome, via medieval
Europe and Victorian Britain, to large parts of modern-day sub-Saharan Africa,
the most common way to take out funeral insurance has been to join a funeral
association. The primary function of these groups is to pool the risk associated
with the death of members or their close relatives by using members’ contributions
to organise funerals. Historians have argued that funeral associations are the pre-
cursors of modern insurance companies (Fingland Jack 1912, Trenerry 1926). More
recently, funeral associations have attracted the attention of economists as instances
of informal or semi-formal risk-pooling groups.
South Africa may be unique in that both formal and informal funeral insurance,
as well as life insurance, are widely held. Traditional funeral associations compete
with modern insurance companies in providing funeral insurance, and the latter also
oﬀer standard life insurance. Traditional African communities co-exist with a fully
industrialised modern economy and world-class formal-sector ﬁnancial institutions.
South Africa therefore provides a good context in which to test the ideas presented
here.
The main contribution of the paper is to present and analyse funeral insurance as
a distinct form of insurance. Its ancient roots and importance in the contemporary
developing world are highlighted. It is also emphasised that even though the asso-
ciation between funeral insurance and funeral associations has been and continues
to be important, the concept of funeral insurance should be be distinguished from
its implementation.
A model is presented in which funeral insurance is contrasted with life insurance.
Whereas previous work on informal insurance has focused on the sustainability of
the contract, this paper abstracts from contractual form and asks under what cir-
cumstances funeral insurance will be preferred to general life insurance. In order to
2focus on the mechanisms of interest, none of the two insurance types are presented
with a cost or eﬃciency advantage over the other. Funeral insurance is modelled as
life insurance bundled with a constraint on the use of the payout. Therefore funeral
insurance can serve as an inter-generational commitment device when the prefer-
ences of the covered individual (the parent) diﬀers from those of the beneﬁciary (the
child). Conditions are derived under which each type of insurance is preferred.
The analysis also contributes to the literature on bequest motives by suggesting
that even conventional life insurance is not necessarily motivated solely by altruism
in the usual sense of the word.
The main theoretical prediction is that funeral insurance is demanded for inter-
mediate wealth and income levels. The prediction is tested with data from South
Africa. A large, nation-wide marketing survey is used here for the ﬁrst time to
econometrically analyse insurance choices as a function of personal and household
characteristics. There is only binary information on insurance take-up in the survey,
and only a very crude measure of wealth can be constructed, but the results of the
analysis are consistent with the prediction of the model.
While not tested here, the model also provides conditions under which funeral
insurance is not demanded for any level of wealth and income. This may help explain
why funeral insurance is less popular in developed countries, even in unequal societies
where segments of the population remain poor.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section provides an
introduction to funeral associations and funeral insurance. Thereafter an overview of
the relevant literature is given, before the model is presented, solved and interpreted.
Next is the empirical section, and ﬁnally a brief conclusion.
2 Funeral associations and the history of insur-
ance
Funeral associations are mutual risk-pooling groups designed to ensure decent funer-
als for members and/or other persons nominated by them, typically close relatives
or household members. When a covered person dies, the group will provide some
combination of cash, labour and goods towards the funeral. Many associations col-
lect ﬁxed cash premia at regular intervals, while others transact only when a death
occurs.1
1Funeral associations are distinct from rotating and accumulating savings and credit associations
(ROSCAs and ASCAs). In all these types of arrangements, a ﬁxed amount of money is typically
collected regularly from each member. But in a ROSCA payout rotates amongst the members in a
systematic fashion, typically determined either randomly or by bidding. During a cycle of ROSCA
3Funeral associations have a long history and global reach. Solon the Athenian
statesman (ca. 638–558 BC) passed a law regulating their activity (Parrott 1985).
They were widespread in the Roman empire, operating on same basic principles as
they do today.2 In medieval Europe they were linked to the professional guilds.
In England around the time of the industrial revolution, funeral associations could
be set up as local community groups, or organised as large friendly associations
(Cordery 2003). For a vivid description of the importance of funeral associations
in British working class life in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, see Johnson
(1985). The history of funeral associations is yet to be written, but Van der Lin-
den (1996) covers the history of mutual beneﬁt associations more generally in 26
countries across Europe, North and South America and Asia. Though many of the
institutions described also cover events other than death, funeral cover seems to
have been the main, or one of the main, components of most of them, and not un-
frequently the only covered event. The enduring popularity of funeral associations
is probably in part due to the inherent insurability of death risk: moral hazard may
be less of a problem than for many other types of risks.
Funeral associations still exist in many countries, though in rich countries their
importance has declined relative to formal insurance. But it is not diﬃcult to ﬁnd
contemporary academic references to funeral associations in the developing world,
and in particular they are widespread in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa.
Funeral associations are often said to be informal insurance providers, but it is
worth clarifying what is meant by ‘informal’ in this context. As Dercon, De Weerdt,
Bold, & Pankhurst (2006) point out, funeral associations often operate according
to a clearly deﬁned, sometimes written, set of rules. The terms of the policy are
speciﬁed in detail, including who is covered, conditions of cover and size of premia
and payouts. Often there is also a system of ﬁnes for non-compliance with these
rules, and at least in South Africa it is not uncommon for funeral associations to
operation, each member will receive the payout exactly once (Besley, Coate & Loury 1993). ASCAs
operate on a similar principle but, as the name suggests, funds may be accumulated and held or
invested jointly rather than being paid out immediately after collection. In contrast, funeral
association payouts are triggered by random events (the death of a covered person) so there is
no guaranteed relationship between contribution and payout over the the period of membership.
Therefore, whereas ROSCAs and ASCAs are fundamentally savings and credit devices (though
various other functions have been suggested in the literature), a funeral association is at the core
a risk-pooling arrangement.
2 ‘Early in the Empire, associations were formed for the purpose of meeting the funeral expenses
of their members [...] These co-operative associations (coll¯ egia f¯ uner¯ at¯ ıcia) started originally
among members of the same guild [...] or among persons of the same occupation. [They] provided
for the necessary funeral expenses by paying into the common fund weekly a small ﬁxed sum, easily
within the reach of the poorest of them. When a member died, a stated sum was drawn from the
treasury for his funeral, a committee saw that the rites were decently performed, and at the proper
seasons [...] the association made corporate oﬀerings to the dead.’ (Johnston 1903)
4have a special uniform which is compulsorily worn by members at meetings and
funerals.
It seems clear that well-deﬁned and strictly enforced policy terms are the norm
rather than exceptional. But most funeral associations are not registered with the
authorities and not regulated. They are not part of the formal economy. In partic-
ular, it is uncertain whether a member of a funeral association who feels unjustly
treated has recourse to the formal judiciary. This clearly distinguishes funeral asso-
ciation membership from policies oﬀered by formal insurance companies.3
However, funeral insurance is not provided only by funeral associations. For-
mal insurance companies still oﬀer explicit funeral policies in several rich countries
including the USA, the UK, Spain and Germany.
A possible objection to the arguments presented in this paper is that funeral
associations oﬀer more than insurance. Whereas formal insurance is close to being
a purely ﬁnancial device, fellow funeral association members are often also friends,
colleagues or relatives who may provide a sense of belonging and support, espe-
cially in times of grief. Nonetheless, virtually all writers on the subject agree that
participants think of their funeral associations as a ﬁnancial arrangement ﬁrst and
foremost. In support of this, a nationally representative South African survey asked
funeral association members why they belonged to these groups. The three most
popular responses were ‘Help with funeral arrangements’ (79%), ‘To help when there
is a death’ (53%), and ‘Provide funerals the family deserves’ (24%). Many fewer
selected the responses ‘To provide comfort and support’ (13%) or ‘To socialise’ (4%)
(FinMark Trust 2003). Likewise, Dercon et al. (2006) report that in both in Ethiopia
and Tanzania, the primary focus of funeral associations is to provide funeral cover.
Funeral associations undeniably have social aspects, but these alone cannot explain
their popularity.
The history of funeral insurance is closely linked with that of funeral associations,
and even today funeral insurance is much more likely than life insurance to be of-
fered informally. Nevertheless, formal-sector funeral insurance exists in many places
(and is common in some, such as South Africa), and so does informal insurance
groups that are not exclusively concerned with funeral cover. It is a key message
of this paper that the type of insurance contract should be distinguished from the
organisational form of the provider. Neither depends on the other, though funeral
insurance appears to be popular in circumstances that favour informal insurance
provision.
3It is possible that Bloch, Genicot & Ray (2008) have in mind another sense of the word
‘informal’ when they write that most informal insurance is bilateral and that ‘our existing idea of
insurance as taking place within an explicit “club” of several people may be misleading.’
53 Related literature
This paper relates to the literature on the demand for life insurance. Modern eco-
nomic analysis of the problem starts with Yaari (1965), who introduced life insurance
as a way of coping with an uncertain lifetime in a model with either a bequest mo-
tive or a credit market combined with a non-negative terminal wealth requirement.
He derives diﬀerential equations for the evolution of consumption and savings, but
does not have much to say about the properties of the demand function. Fischer
(1973) characterises insurance demand functions in a discrete-time model. Campbell
(1980) derives insurance demand functions by using Taylor expansion of the agent’s
p r o b l e mi nas h o r ti n t e r v a l( t,t +Δ t), but relies on the present value of future
income being exogenously given. Lewis (1989) was the ﬁrst to consider the point
of view of the insurance beneﬁciaries. He lets insurance demand be determined by
the intended beneﬁciary. In this paper it will be shown that a conﬂict of interest
between policy-holder and beneﬁciary may be the key driver of demand for funeral
insurance.
Economists have long been interested in why people leave bequests. Some believe
bequests are accidental and caused by the combination of uncertain lifetimes and
imperfect insurance markets. On the other hand, Bernheim (1991) uses evidence on
life insurance demand to argue that bequests are intentional. This paper nuances the
discussion by positing that even if they are intentional, bequests are not necessarily
altruistic in the usual sense. Life insurance may be motivated by a concern for
speciﬁc types of post-mortem expenditure that have more to do with preserving
one’s own good name and afterlife than with either ‘warm glow’ or true altruism.
There is a large literature on informal arrangements for coping with risk in
developing countries. Besley (1995), Morduch (1999) and Dercon (2002) provide
overviews. Townsend (1994) tests for, and rejects, full risk-sharing in Indian villages.
This ﬁnding has been veriﬁed by many later studies, and the robustness of the result
has inspired a substantial body of theoretical work relating imperfect enforcement
to bounds on the risk-sharing contracts that may be entered. Ligon, Thomas &
Worrall (2002) is a more recent contribution to this tradition. This paper departs
from that literature by focusing on the speciﬁcs of the insurance policy rather than
whether full risk-sharing is achieved.
Arnott & Stiglitz (1991) is perhaps the best-known article on the interaction
of formal and informal insurance. The authors ﬁnd that in the presence of moral
hazard and formal insurance, informal insurance is beneﬁcial if the informal insurers
have an information advantage, but can be harmful if not. The model presented
here abstracts completely from moral hazard, arguing that death insurance is much
6less likely to be subject to this problem than many other types of insurance. This
is in line with Fafchamps & Lund (2003) who ﬁnd that funerals are better insured
with informal gifts and loans than other events such as crop failure and mild illness.
A small literature focuses on commitment devices in developing countries, a good
example of which is Ashraf, Karlan & Yin (2006). These papers are related to the
theoretical literature on hyperbolic discounting (Harris & Laibson 2003). But not
much is known about devices that operate between generations.
Funeral associations have received relatively little attention from economists.
Dercon et al. (2006) discuss funeral associations in Ethiopia and Tanzania, and Bold
(2007) test for risk-sharing in Ethiopian associations. Bryant & Prohmmo (2002)
ask why funeral association premia in a village in North-Eastern Thailand are equal
for all households irrespective of risk. A good source of information on the workings
and characteristics of funeral associations in South Africa (known locally as burial
societies) is Thomson & Posel (2002). Roth (2001) is a case study of formal and
informal funeral insurance in a rural South African township. Ardington & Leib-
brandt (2004) ﬁnd a strong correlation between formal employment and the take-up
of funeral insurance. Keswell (2004) looks at the relationship between employment
and membership of informal networks such as ROSCAs and funeral associations.
This paper parallels parts of the literature on rotating savings and credit asso-
ciations (ROSCAs). In an early paper, Geertz (1962) saw ROSCAs as a ‘middle
rung’ in the ladder of development, implying that they would eventually give way
to formal institutions. This paper will show that funeral insurance is demanded for
intermediate income and wealth. Moreover, if the survival probability is suﬃciently
high, as may be the case in developed societies, then there is no demand for funeral
insurance at any level of income or wealth. Levenson & Besley (1996) look at the
determinants of ROSCA participation in Taiwan. In a situation semblant of that of
funeral associations in South Africa, they deem ROSCA membership in Thailand




There are two agents, a parent and a child, and two periods. In the ﬁrst period the
parent, endowed with wealth W, decides how much (if any) insurance cover to buy
and pays the premium.
The parent survives to the second period with probability q. If she survives,
7she receives labour income y and consumes everything before the game ends. If she
dies, there is no labour income but the child inherits the parent’s remaining wealth
and receives any insurance payout. The child allocates her resources between the
parent’s funeral and her own consumption.
There are two types of funeral; basic (‘pauper’s funeral’) and elaborate (‘digniﬁed
funeral’). An elaborate funeral costs p, and the cost of a basic funeral is normalised
to zero.
There are also two types of insurance. Both pay out if and only if the parent
dies. The only diﬀerence between them is that a life insurance payout L can be
spent as the beneﬁciary chooses, whereas a funeral insurance payout F can only be
spent on the parent’s funeral. In both cases the premium per unit of cover is 1 − q,
the actuarially fair rate.
In addition there is a ﬁxed contract cost associated with each insurance type the
parent buys. The contract cost is initially assumed to be positive but inﬁnitesimal.
This implies that it can be ignored for the purposes of determining the level of
insurance cover demanded, and that the insurance premia are actuarially fair, but
also that the parent is induced to prefer a single insurance contract whenever she is
otherwise indiﬀerent between a single contract and a mix of both types of insurance.
The relaxation of the assumption of negligible contract cost is discussed in a later
section.
The parent’s consumption in period 1 is assumed to be static and netted out of
the model by adjusting the endowment W and the parent’s utility by a constant.
Both parent and child have logarithmic consumption utilities. In case of survival,
the parent derives utility from the consumption of all her resources, U = ln(C).
In case of death she derives utility from (the anticipation of) her own funeral and,
altruistically, the child’s consumption,
U = BD+ ln(c).
Here, B is the ﬁxed utility gain to the parent associated with an elaborate funeral,
and D is an indicator equal to 1 if an elaborate funeral is held and 0 if not. c is the
child’s consumption. Without loss of generality the altruism coeﬃcient (the weight
of the child’s consumption utility in the parent’s utility) has been normalised to 1
by adjusting B.
The child’s utility is given by
u = μBD + ln(c).
8The constant μ determines the relative importance of the funeral and consumption
terms from the child’s point of view. It is assumed that μ<1, so that although the
parent and the child derive utility from the same two sources in the case of death
(the parent’s funeral and the child’s consumption), in relative terms the funeral
matters less to the child than it does to the parent. It is this conﬂict of interest that
will drive the demand for funeral insurance.
The parent’s problem is to determine the insurance portfolio that maximises her
expected utility conditional on the child’s decision function.
It is immediately clear that the parent will never take out a larger funeral in-
surance cover than p, the cost of an elaborate funeral, since doing so would be
wasteful.
The child’s problem is to allocate her available resources w (bequest plus any
insurance payouts) between the funeral and her own consumption so as to maximise
utility, subject to the restriction that a funeral insurance payout can only be spent
on the funeral. Her choice is binary: she can either arrange a basic funeral and
consume all her resources (except any funeral insurance payout), or she can arrange
an elaborate funeral at cost p and consume w − p.
It is clear that the child will always arrange an elaborate funeral if she receives
a funeral insurance payout of p.
4.2 Demand for life and funeral insurance
Proposition 1. If
1 − q
1 − e−(1−q)B <
1
1 − e−μB − q, (1)
then the parent’s insurance demand, represented by F and L, can be characterised
as follows:















If (1) does not hold, then funeral insurance is not demanded for any combination
of W, y and p.
Proof. Consider ﬁrst the situation where only life insurance is available. Then
the child’s problem can be written:
max
D∈{0,1}
μBD + ln(w − pD)






such that the child arranges a basic funeral if w<w ∗, is indiﬀerent between the two
types if w = w∗ and prefers an elaborate funeral if w>w ∗. To emphasise that the
child’s decision depends on her available resources, the notation D(w) is introduced.
In the absence of funeral insurance, the parent’s problem can be written
max
L≥0
{q ln(C)+( 1− q)[BD(w) + ln(w − pD(w))]}
where
C = W − (1 − q)L + y
w = W − (1 − q)L + L
denote next-period wealth in case of survival and death, respectively. Recall that
the parent consumes all resources in the case of survival.
To solve the parent’s problem, ﬁrst assume that the child decides to arrange a
basic funeral, D = 0. Then the problem simpliﬁes to
max
L≥0
{q ln(W − (1 − q)L + y)+( 1− q)ln(W + qL)}.
This is a standard insurance problem with an actuarially fair premium, so the solu-
tion is full insurance,
L = y.
It follows that, in this case:
C = w = W + qy
EU = ln(W + qy)




{q ln(W − (1 − q)L + y)+( 1− q)[B + ln(W + qL− p)]}.
The ﬁrst-order condition yields
L = y + p,
10and it follows that, in this case:
C = W + qy − (1 − q)p
w = W + q(y + p)
EU =( 1− q)B + ln(W + qy − (1 − q)p)
The parent prefers the solution candidate conditional on D = 0 over the solution
candidate conditional on D = 1 when the expected utility associated with the former
is greater, leading to the condition
W + qy <
(1 − q)p
1 − e−(1−q)B. (2)
However, the parent’s preferred solution is only feasible if the assumption re-
garding D is justiﬁed, that is if the child ‘agrees’ with the parent in the choice of
funeral type. When the parent sets L = y, the left-hand side of (2) is w, and it
can be shown that the right-hand side is less than w∗. Hence, whenever the parent
prefers D = 0, the child agrees.
But when L = y +p, the child only agrees with the parent’s preference D =1i f




leading to the condition
W + qy >
p
1 − e−μB − qp, (3)
If (3) holds, the solution is L = y + p and D = 1. However, if neither (2) nor (3)
hold, the best the parent can do while achieving D = 1 is to set L such that w = w∗.
The ultimate choice of life cover is then a matter of comparing the expected utility
at this level, leading to D =1 ,a n dL = y, implying D =0 .
Next consider how the introduction of funeral insurance will change the solution.
It will not aﬀect the case when parent and child agree on holding a basic funeral,
since taking out funeral insurance is not in the parent’s interest then. And when
parent and child agree on holding an elaborate funeral, funeral insurance up to the
level of p makes no diﬀerence except to introduce an additional contract cost. And
a level of funeral insurance greater than p would be wasteful, so the parent takes
out the whole amount of cover y + p in life insurance.
Therefore, compared to the situation with only life insurance, funeral insurance
is only of interest in the intermediate case that neither (2) nor (3) hold, i.e. when
there is a conﬂict of interest between parent and child. In this case, funeral insurance
11can be used to force an elaborate funeral while holding total insurance cover at the
ﬁrst-best level y + p. Here, both L and F are demanded at strictly positive levels,
in such a way that their sum is y + p. F = p and L = y is always a solution, and
F can never exceed p, but in general the critical level of F needed to enforce an
elaborate funeral is positive but may be less than p. The critical level F ∗ is the one










q +( 1− q)e
μB
.
Note that the critical level decreases as W +qy increases, as the conﬂict of interests
is attenuated.
If (1) does not hold, then the conﬂict of interest is reversed in the sense that
there is a region in which the child wants an elaborate funeral but the parent does
not. Funeral insurance is of no interest to the parent in this case, and hence is never
demanded. 
4.3 An alternative derivation using approximate CRRA
This section presents an alternative derivation of the main prediction. Rather than
assuming logarithmic utility, the agents’ consumption utility is of a general CRRA
form, x1−ρ
1−ρ ,w h e r ex is consumption and ρ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aver-
sion. A part from the form of the utility function, the setup is unchanged. Taylor
approximations are used to arrive at an analytical solution.















Fair premia implies full insurance L = y or L = y + p as before. The parent
prefers D =1o v e rD = 0 when
(1 − q)B +





12A Taylor approximation that assumes (1 − q)p is small gives





It is straight-forward to show that the D = 1 solution is feasible when


















































4.4 Interpretation of the main result
The term W + qy represents expected second-period resources in the absence of
insurance. Dividing by p is just a price normalisation that expresses these resources
in terms of the number of units of elaborate funerals that the expected resources
can aﬀord.
Proposition 1 says that for low expected resources, the parent buys full life
insurance cover for the potential loss of labour income, but does not take out any
funeral cover because both parent and child prefer a basic funeral. For high expected
resources, the parent buys life insurance to cover both the income loss and the cost of
an elaborate funeral. Since the child is in agreement concerning the type of funeral,
funeral insurance is not required and a pure life policy avoids the extra contract cost
of a mixed insurance portfolio.
For intermediate expected wealth, the parent prefers an elaborate funeral but
the child does not. By buying a portfolio of funeral and life insurance, the parent
can achieve an elaborate funeral at the ﬁrst-best level of total cover, y + p. Funeral
13insurance will not exceed p since that is wasteful, implying that the amount of life
cover is strictly positive. The amount of funeral cover is also strictly positive, since
otherwise the child would not hold an elaborate funeral. There is a critical level of
funeral cover (between zero and p) above which an elaborate funeral is guaranteed.
Any insurance portfolio satisfying these conditions is a valid solution. But setting
funeral insurance equal to p, the full cost of an elaborate funeral, and life insurance
equal to y, is always a valid solution in the intermediate case.
4.5 When is funeral insurance ruled out?
Equation (1) depends only on q, B and μ. That is, for certain combinations of these
three parameters, there is no demand for funeral insurance irrespective of initial
wealth, labour income and funeral cost. The equation can be regarded as deﬁning
an upper bound for μ,i nt e r m so fB and q.
The next result provides a more formal characterisation of the conditions that
rule out a demand for funeral insurance. It will be shown that funeral insurance is
ruled out if the parent’s survival probability is too high.
Proposition 2. When μ + q>1 ,t h e r ei saB∗ such that for B>B ∗, there is no
demand for funeral insurance irrespective of W, y and p. The critical value B∗ is
decreasing in μ and q.W h e nμ + q ≤ 1 funeral insurance cannot be ruled out for
any ﬁnite B.
Proof. From (1), the critical value B∗ satisﬁes
1 − q
1 − e−(1−q)B∗ + q =
1
1 − e−μB∗.





















14Then the single-crossing property implies that for any q and μ satisfying μ>1−q,
that is μ + q>1, there is a unique B∗ > 0. For B>B ∗, (1) does not hold and
funeral insurance is ruled out.
∂μ
∂B∗ < 0a n d
∂μ
∂q < 0 imply that B∗ depend negatively
on μ as well as q.
For μ + q ≤ 1, there is no ﬁnite, positive solution for B∗, so funeral insurance
cannot be ruled out. 
Although this theoretical result cannot easily be tested with the data used in
this paper, it is interesting to note that it may explain why funeral insurance is
less popular in rich countries (even among the relatively poor) than in developing
countries. Assuming μ and B are identically distributed across countries, there is a
threshold for q above which there is no demand for funeral insurance irrespective of
W and y. So if economic development raises general health levels (proxied by the
theoretical survival probability q), then demand for funeral insurance may drop oﬀ
even if the distribution of income is unchanged.
4.6 Non-negligible contract costs
The model presented above assumes positive but inﬁnitesimal contract costs. This
simpliﬁes the analysis by retaining actuarially fair premia (ensuring a full-insurance
solution) while implying that a single insurance contract is preferred over two insur-
ance contracts when the agent is otherwise indiﬀerent.
However, in reality transaction costs are likely to be important and the insurance
premium greater than the actuarially fair rate, especially for the low-value contracts
typically taken out by poor people. Introducing a non-negligible ﬁxed cost per
contract would capture a realistic cost structure for the insurance providers and
also result in the net premium per unit of cover being higher for small transactions,
which corresponds with anecdotal evidence.
An important eﬀect of introducing a non-negligible contract fee in the above
framework is that in some parameter regions it would become optimal not to take
out any insurance at all.
Non-negligible transaction costs would not, however, change the main prediction
of the model: funeral insurance would not be demanded outside an intermediate
region of wealth and income. Denoting the contract cost by t, a similar argument to
the above quickly establishes that there is no demand for funeral insurance unless
1 − q
1 − e−(1−q)B <




1 − e−μB − q. (4)
However, even when (4) holds, there might be parameter values for which only
15funeral insurance, or only life insurance, is taken out.
Furthermore, demand for life insurance as a function of expected wealth is no
longer necessarily increasing everywhere.
5 Empirics
5.1 Predictions from theory
The data used here provides only binary information on whether a respondent has
life or funeral insurance. Therefore, only model predictions about the binary take-
up function, rather than amount of insurance cover, are testable. Hence, the main
testable prediction from the theory is that only agents with intermediate levels
of expected resources W + qy should demand funeral insurance. In other words,
plotted as a function of expected resources, take-up of funeral insurance should be
‘box-shaped’: zero for low values, one for intermediate values and zero for high
values of expected wealth.
However, this assumes that households are homogeneous with respect to model
parameters and that there is no measurement error. Allowing for heterogeneity and
measurement error, aggregate take-up of funeral insurance is expected to be hump-
shaped rather than box-shaped: ﬁrst rising and then falling as the levels of wealth
and income increase.
The model also predicts that life insurance demand should be weakly increasing
in wealth and income. The base model also predicts that all agents should have some
life insurance, but the presence of non-negligible transaction costs would introduce a
region of no insurance take-up for lower resource levels. Together with heterogeneity
and measurement error, this could mean that the take-up of life insurance increases
with wealth and income.
Studying take-up as a function of W + qy, taken as a single quantity, requires
scaling income into wealth equivalents by ﬁxing a time period over which the in-
surance policy is valid, q is the survival probability and the expected income is
y.
An alternative approach is suggested by the fact that holding wealth ﬁxed, fu-
neral insurance take-up should be hump-shaped in income, and vice versa. This is
the approach taken here.
165.2 Data
The household data are taken from the 2004 wave of the All Media and Products
Survey (AMPS) published by the South African Advertising Research Foundation.
AMPS is a long-running series of cross-sectional surveys covering South Africans
aged 16 and over. The sample of 24,489 over-represents the higher income brackets,
but weights inversely proportional to the probability of selection are provided to
allow inferences about the underlying population.
The survey respondent is a randomly chosen person above the age of 16 in the
selected household. The emphasis of the questionnaire is on commercial product us-
age, but there are also sections covering personal data, family and housing situation,
and leisure activities.
For a number of the most relevant variables, only binary information is available.
For instance, respondents are asked whether they have a life cover policy, but no
further details on the policy are provided. Appendix A provides more detail on the
construction of the variables used. It is worth noting that the constructed measure
of wealth is crude: the household is asked whether they own each of a list of durable
goods, and the simple count of goods present in the household is used here as the
proxy for wealth.
Weighted summary statistics are provided in Table 1. They suggest that 27.8%
of South Africans aged 16 or over belong to a funeral association. This is lower
than earlier estimates. (It corresponds to 6.6 million members across South Africa
rather than 8 million as suggested by Porteous & Hazelhurst (2004).) Furthermore,
6.8% personally have formal funeral insurance. Given the data it is not possible
to distinguish those who do not personally have any formal or informal funeral
insurance but is covered by someone else’s policy, from those who are not covered
at all. 5.5% of the population have life insurance.
One-year survival rates by sex and age in ﬁve-year bands were obtained from the
WHO Life Tables for South Africa (World Health Organization 2011). The numbers
for 2000 and 2009 were interpolated to provide an estimate for survival rates in 2004.
5.3 Results
As a graphical precursor to the results, consider Figures 1 and 2. Here the take-up of
funeral insurance and life insurance are plotted against household assets and income,
respectively. The general pattern is consistent with the theoretical prediction that
the take-up of funeral insurance hump-shaped with respect to assets and income.
Life insurance take-up shows a strong positive relationship with income and
17assets. This is consistent with there being signiﬁcant transaction costs associated
with taking out life insurance.
The empirical speciﬁcation is
fi = α + γWi + δW
2
i + λqiyi + ν(qiyi)
2 + βXi +  i,
where fi is a binary take-up variable for funeral insurance for household i, Wi is
household assets, qiyi is expected (or ‘life-expectancy-adjusted’) personal income
and Xi a vector of control variables.
The control variables are the sex, age, age squared and education of the respon-
dent, dummies for whether he/she is married, has own children and lives in a rural
area. Province dummies and house/car ownership are also included.
The main results are presented in Table 2. The indicator for take-up of funeral
insurance is regressed on assets, assets squared, expected income and expected in-
come squared using least squares and the survey weights. In column 1 there are no
control variables. The coeﬃcients on the linear asset and income terms are positive
and signiﬁcant, and the coeﬃcients on the squared asset and income terms are neg-
ative and signiﬁcant, indicating a hump-shaped relationship. Here and throughout,
standard errors are robust and clustered at the province level.
Column 2 adds control variables for respondent sex, age, age squared, education
(binary variables for having completed primary school and high school) and province
dummies. Column 3 adds further controls: marital status, having children, living
in a rural area, owning a ‘proper’ home and a binary indicator for having bought
anything on credit over the past year. The qualitative ﬁnding is unchanged. Column
4 drops observations in seven highest income categories, corresponding to 0.54% of
the sample. The purpose is to alleviate concerns that outliers at the upper end of the
distribution are driving the results, but clearly there is also a danger that this will
‘cut oﬀ the right leg of the hump’. Also, this avoids having to rely on an arbitrary
‘midpoint’ value for the highest income category which in principle is unbounded.
The qualitative ﬁndings are unchanged.
Table 3 presents the results of a weighted probit regressions. The column order
is the same as above, and again the coeﬃcient on the squared asset and income
terms are negative throughout.
Table 4 presents the results of an OLS regression. For this regression, the fre-
quency weights supplied with the data are ignored. The qualitative ﬁndings are
unchanged.
In the regressions presented in Table 5, the analysis is conﬁned to respondents
classiﬁed as household decision makers, i.e. heads of households and housewives. For
18columns 1–3, the coeﬃcients on the squared asset term becomes only marginally
signiﬁcant, but otherwise the qualitative ﬁndings remain the same. In column 4
(where the highest income respondents are dropped), the signs of the coeﬃcients
remain the same but both the linear and the squared asset terms lose signiﬁcance.
In Table 6, raw income rather than life expectancy-adjusted income is used. The
qualitative ﬁndings are signiﬁcant and unchanged.
6 Conclusion
This paper is the ﬁrst to present a model of funeral insurance as a distinct form
of insurance. Funeral insurance is modelled as classic life insurance bundled with a
constraint on how the payout is spent. When there is a conﬂict of interest between
the insurance holder and the beneﬁciary on how a life insurance payout should be
spent, funeral insurance can resolve the issue in favour of the parent by functioning
as an inter-generational commitment device.
The theory predicts that take-up of funeral insurance should be hump-shaped
in income and wealth. Using a nationally representative data on black households
in South Africa, where both life and funeral insurance are widely available, this
prediction is conﬁrmed, although the data only allows a crude measure of household
wealth to be constructed.
A second prediction, that there are conditions in which funeral insurance is not
demanded at any level of income or wealth, is not testable with the data used
here. But the prediction corresponds to a notion that general improvements in
public health (proxied by an increase in the model’s survival probability q)m a y
reduce the demand for funeral insurance even holding the distribution of income
and wealth constant. This may explain why funeral insurance is relatively unpopular
in developed countries, even those characterised by high inequality in income and
wealth.
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22A Variable construction
Under the heading ‘Financial Services’, the survey asks: ‘Here is a list of diﬀerent
types of policies and investment plans which you can take out with a ﬁnancial
services company. Can you please tell me which, if any, you PERSONALLY have?
This excludes any cover or beneﬁts provided by your employer/company’ (original
emphasis). Respondents who have indicate either ‘Life cover policy’ or ‘Endowment,
investment, savings or education plan/policy with life cover’ (original emphasis) are
coded as having life insurance. Those who indicate the option ‘Funeral insurance’,
are coded as formal funeral policy holders.
In the ‘Sport, entertainment and leisure’ section, the following question is asked:
‘For the activities listed below, please indicate your personal frequency of each ac-
tivity, if at all’ (original emphasis). The options given were ‘weekly’, ‘monthly’,
‘yearly’ and ‘not at all’. Respondents reporting that they attend funeral association
meetings ‘weekly’ or ‘monthly’ are coded as funeral association members. A respon-
dent is coded as having funeral insurance if he/she has a formal funeral policy or is
a member of a funeral association. No information on premia, cover or conditions
is provided for either type of insurance.
There are several caveats to keep in mind when interpreting these variables.
First, it appears to be quite common for people to get funeral cover through their
employer in South Africa, but this is explicitly excluded from the question above
and therefore is not recorded in the data. Second, it is also quite common for funeral
parlours to sell a form of funeral cover (illegally). These may not be recorded in
the data since the survey explicitly asks for funeral cover with a ‘ﬁnancial services
company’. Third, some insurance companies masquerade as funeral associations.
These may not be recorded in the data since they do not require their customers to
attend regular association meetings, and it is not clear whether respondents would
recognize them as a ‘ﬁnancial services company’.
In the survey, monthly household income is recorded not as a number but cat-
egorised as being in one of 33 income ranges. These are coded to a scalar income
variable by using the midpoint of each band. The highest band, ZAR 40,000 and
above, is coded as ZAR 45,000. 1% of households report this income band.
Information on assets is crude. The respondents were asked which of a list of
durable goods ‘are presently in the household’. The asset index used in this paper
is a simple count of how many of these assets are reported by the respondent.
It would be possible to obtain an approximate value for a typical good of each
category, but the associated uncertainty makes it questionable whether this would
substantially increase the quality of the index. The list of assets is: electric stove,
23other (gas or coal) stove, electric hotplate, microwave oven, refrigerator or combined
fridge/freezer, free standing deep freezer, vacuum cleaner/ﬂoor polisher, dishwasher,
automatic front loading washing machine, automatic top loading washing machine,
semi-automatic/twin tub washing machine, tumble dryer, sewing machine - electric
or manual, television set, video cassette recorder, personal computer/personal laptop
in home, hi-ﬁ/music centre, DVD player.
A household was coded as owning a ‘proper’ home if all of the following are sat-
isﬁed: It owns its dwelling. The dwelling is a ‘House’, ‘Cluster House’, ‘Town House’
or ‘Flat’, as opposed to a ‘Matchbox House’, ‘Traditional Hut’, ‘Hostel’, ‘Hotel /
Boarding House’, ‘Compound’, ‘Room in Backyard’, ‘Squatter Hut’, ‘Caravan’ or
‘Other’. The dwelling is electriﬁed and has water on tap, a hot water tank, a toilet
and a sink.
Clearly the value of a ‘proper house’ has the potential to dwarf the value of
the asset index discussed above. But their values are not provided, and since the
regression speciﬁcation includes the square of assets, house ownership cannot be
used in the main wealth metric but is included as a control variable.
There is no information on debts except a binary indicating whether the house-
hold has a ‘home loan/mortgage bond’, and whether the respondent has ‘bought
any durable items, such as appliances/furniture, on credit during the PAST 12
MONTHS? Credit includes hire purchase, instalment sale and payment on terms’
(original emphasis). Clearly buying on credit could inﬂate the asset index used here,
so a binary variable for having purchased items on credit is included as a control.
The ‘Rural’ indicator is set to 1 if the household’s community size is ‘Less than
500/Rural’.
The respondent is coded as having own children if he/she answered yes to the
question: ‘Do you have any young or unmarried children of your own?’ There is no
information on children more generally.
The respondent is coded as married/cohabiting if he/she reported ‘Married or
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Figure 1: The take-up of life and funeral insurance as a function of household assets.
Funeral insurance take-up is hump-shaped in assets, in accordance with the theory.
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Figure 2: The take-up of life and funeral insurance as a function of personal income.
Funeral insurance take-up is hump-shaped in income, in accordance with the theory.
Life insurance take-up is increasing with income, which is consistent with large
transaction costs.
25Table 1: Descriptive statistics (weighted)
Mean StDev Obs
Has funeral insurance (0/1) 0.321 0.467 11882
informal 0.278 0.448 11882
formal 0.068 0.251 11882
Has life insurance (0/1) 0.055 0.228 11882
Asset index (0-14) 3.226 2.485 11882
Personal income 809.696 1839.723 11735
Life expectancy-adjusted personal income 794.711 1810.518 11735
Household income 2412.013 3319.472 11882
Female 0.500 0.500 11882
Age 35.720 15.538 11882
Completed primary school 0.508 0.500 11882
Completed high school 0.270 0.444 11882
Married or co-habiting 0.363 0.481 11882
Has child 0.605 0.489 11882
Lives in rural area 0.509 0.500 11882
Owns ’proper’ home 0.078 0.268 11882
Has purchased on credit in the last 12 months 0.057 0.232 11882
Is household decisionmaker 0.681 0.466 11882
26Table 2: Main results: Weighted OLS









Household assets 0.0361** 0.0261*** 0.0239** 0.0223**
(0.0123) (0.00686) (0.00719) (0.00710)
Household assets squared -0.00276** -0.00188** -0.00175** -0.00152**
(0.000957) (0.000649) (0.000627) (0.000608)
Expected personal
income
0.0000731*** 0.0000520*** 0.0000436*** 0.0000547***
(0.00000954) (0.00000770) (0.00000742) (0.00000816)
Expected personal
inc squared
-2.12e-09*** -1.46e-09*** -1.21e-09*** -2.44e-09**
(4.95e-10) (3.38e-10) (3.18e-10) (8.35e-10)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11735 11735 11735 11672
Weighted least squares regression results.
The dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether the respondent has funeral insurance.
Column 2 includes controls for respondent sex, age, age squared, education (binary variables for having
completed primary school and high school) and province dummies.
Column 3 adds further controls for marital status, having children, living in a rural area, owning
a ’proper’ home and a binary indicator for having bought anything on credit over the past year.
Column 4 drops observations in the seven highest income categories.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the province level.
* p¡0.10, ** p¡0.05, *** p¡0.01
27Table 3: Weighted probit











Household assets 0.108** 0.0897*** 0.0830*** 0.0782***
(0.0427) (0.0292) (0.0303) (0.0300)
Household assets squared -0.00838** -0.00686** -0.00643** -0.00570**
(0.00340) (0.00269) (0.00267) (0.00260)
Expected personal
income
0.000193*** 0.000143*** 0.000119*** 0.000157***
(0.0000275) (0.0000241) (0.0000224) (0.0000271)
Expected personal
inc squared
-5.41e-09*** -3.95e-09*** -3.27e-09*** -7.81e-09***
(1.25e-09) (8.90e-10) (8.25e-10) (2.55e-09)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11735 11735 11735 11672
Weighted probit regression results.
The dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether the respondent has funeral insurance.
Column 2 includes controls for respondent sex, age, age squared, education (binary variables for having
completed primary school and high school) and province dummies.
Column 3 adds further controls for marital status, having children, living in a rural area, owning
a ’proper’ home and a binary indicator for having bought anything on credit over the past year.
Column 4 drops observations in the seven highest income categories.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the province level.
* p¡0.10, ** p¡0.05, *** p¡0.01
28Table 4: Unweighted OLS results









Household assets 0.0270*** 0.0225*** 0.0207** 0.0187**
(0.00774) (0.00601) (0.00630) (0.00650)
Household assets squared -0.00247*** -0.00175*** -0.00161*** -0.00132**
(0.000541) (0.000436) (0.000426) (0.000430)
Expected personal
income
0.0000723*** 0.0000489*** 0.0000419*** 0.0000683***
(0.00000846) (0.00000829) (0.00000840) (0.0000102)
Expected personal
inc squared
-2.16e-09*** -1.45e-09*** -1.24e-09*** -4.34e-09***
(4.17e-10) (3.42e-10) (3.38e-10) (8.52e-10)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11735 11735 11735 11672
OLS regression results.
The dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether the respondent has funeral insurance.
Column 2 includes controls for respondent sex, age, age squared, education (binary variables for having
completed primary school and high school) and province dummies.
Column 3 adds further controls for marital status, having children, living in a rural area, owning
a ’proper’ home and a binary indicator for having bought anything on credit over the past year.
Column 4 drops observations in the seven highest income categories.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the province level.
* p¡0.10, ** p¡0.05, *** p¡0.01
29Table 5: Results with only decision-maker respondents









Household assets 0.0420** 0.0291** 0.0246** 0.0225*
(0.0143) (0.0100) (0.0105) (0.0104)
Household assets squared -0.00252* -0.00198* -0.00187* -0.00157
(0.00122) (0.001000) (0.00100) (0.000985)
Expected personal
income
0.0000526*** 0.0000475*** 0.0000396*** 0.0000544***
(0.0000102) (0.00000990) (0.00000917) (0.0000132)
Expected personal
inc squared
-1.52e-09** -1.35e-09*** -1.10e-09** -2.75e-09**
(4.63e-10) (3.83e-10) (3.53e-10) (1.18e-09)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7641 7641 7641 7586
Weighted least squares regression results. Only household heads and housewives are included.
The dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether the respondent has funeral insurance.
Column 2 includes controls for respondent sex, age, age squared, education (binary variables for having
completed primary school and high school) and province dummies.
Column 3 adds further controls for marital status, having children, living in a rural area, owning
a ’proper’ home and a binary indicator for having bought anything on credit over the past year.
Column 4 drops observations in the seven highest income categories.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the province level.
* p¡0.10, ** p¡0.05, *** p¡0.01
30Table 6: Results using raw income (not adjusted for survival probability)









Household assets 0.0362** 0.0261*** 0.0239** 0.0223**
(0.0123) (0.00686) (0.00719) (0.00710)
Household assets squared -0.00277** -0.00188** -0.00176** -0.00152**
(0.000958) (0.000649) (0.000627) (0.000608)
Personal income 0.0000722*** 0.0000512*** 0.0000429*** 0.0000539***
(0.00000949) (0.00000760) (0.00000731) (0.00000794)
Personal income
squared
-2.06e-09*** -1.42e-09*** -1.17e-09*** -2.37e-09**
(4.90e-10) (3.33e-10) (3.13e-10) (8.05e-10)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11735 11735 11735 11672
Weighted least squares regression results.
The dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether the respondent has funeral insurance.
Column 2 includes controls for respondent sex, age, age squared, education (binary variables for having
completed primary school and high school) and province dummies.
Column 3 adds further controls for marital status, having children, living in a rural area, owning
a ’proper’ home and a binary indicator for having bought anything on credit over the past year.
Column 4 drops observations in the seven highest income categories.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the province level.
* p¡0.10, ** p¡0.05, *** p¡0.01
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